INTRODUCTION
California's recent earthquake history, particularly the 1994 Northridge earthquake, shows that moderate earthquakes can be costly and deadly, and that even in California, there remains substantial risk of injuries in earthquakes. To understand this risk properly, it is worthwhile to quantify past injury experience in both human and economic terms.
Injuries by treatment category. In 1998, public-health researchers at UCLA ͑Shoaf et al. 1998 , Peek-Asa et al. 1998 estimated the number of people injured in the 1994 Northridge earthquake. ͑In epidemiology, and as used here, the term "injuries" includes fatal ones͒. They reviewed coroner reports and hospital records to determine the number of hospitalized injuries and performed a populationbased survey to estimate the number of non-hospitalized injuries. The population-based survey involved computer-assisted telephone interviews of 1,830 residents of Los Ange-
VALUE OF INJURIES
There are a number of methodologies for estimating the cost of injuries. The U.S. Department of Transportation assigned dollar values to statistical injuries avoided, based on a study by the Urban Institute ͑1991͒. ͑The phrase "statistical injuries" is used here to indicate that these are not injuries to particular people in an immediate situation, but rather to unknown people at an unknown future date.͒ These values are used to estimate the benefits of regulatory action and risk remediation, and have been used by the Federal Aviation Administration ͑FAA 1998͒ and Federal Highway Administration ͑FHWA 1994͒. The Urban Institute ͑1991͒ figures are comprehensive costs for statistical injuries, reflecting pain and lost quality of life, medical and legal costs, lost earnings, lost household production, etc. The comprehensive cost is dominated by pain and lost quality of life, which represent 60-80% of the total. Lost wages represent 5-18%, while medical costs represent a relatively small portion of the comprehensive cost, typically 5-6%.
These values can be controversial, so some discussion is warranted. The Urban Institute's ͑1991͒ comprehensive costs were not limited to highway safety. They were averaged from 49 distinct studies of the value of small changes in safety, of which only 11 had to do with automobiles. They included 30 studies of the additional wages that people demand to accept elevated safety risks; 5 of the market prices for products that provide additional safety ͑e.g., safer cars, smoke detectors, houses in less polluted areas͒; 6 of the cost of safety behavior ͑e.g., roadway speed choice and decisions about smoking͒; and eight surveys ͑e.g., about auto safety and fire safety͒.
The 49 studies produced fairly consistent values. They ranged from $1.0 to 3.6 million for the value of a statistical fatality avoided. Their average was $2.2 million; their standard deviation, $0.6 million. The Urban Institute ͑1991͒ authors addressed the value of nonfatal injuries by dividing the value of fatal risk reduction by the ratio of the years of lost life in a fatality versus the years of functional capacity at risk ͑meaning pain or impaired mobility, cognition, self care, and other measure of quality of life͒.
Again, these values are not arbitrary figures selected by a government agency or contractor. Nor are they values that people would demand to receive a known injury ͑"how much money would you take to receive a minor scalp laceration right now?"͒. Rather they are values of such an injury implied by what people have paid or demand to be paid for slight increases or decreases in life safety. For example, if people have been observed to pay $100 to decrease by 1 in 10,000 their chance of death from some particular peril, the implied value of avoiding one statistical fatality would be $100/0.0001, or $1 million.
As noted above, the U.S. government adopted such values and they are therefore used here. The dollar values to prevent statistical injuries are shown in Table 1 . They are expressed in terms of the Abbreviated Injury Severity ͑AIS͒ code, a classification system developed by the Association for the Advancement of Automotive Medicine ͑AAAM 2001͒. The AIS scale is an anatomical scoring system, in that it reflects the nature of the injuries and resulting threat to life. It was originally developed for use in quantifying automobile-related injuries, but has been broadened to include other types and causes of injuries. The AIS dictionary ͑AAAM 2001͒ currently lists approximately 1,300 injuries, each with a distinct 7-digit numerical injury identifier. Table 1 shows a few example injuries from each AIS level.
The comprehensive costs shown in Table 1 are not uncertain. They are not mean values with statistical distributions, but rather discrete values chosen by the agencies of the federal government to represent the benefit associated with avoiding one such statistical injury. Note also that each AIS level 1 through 5 represents a range of injuries. Despite that, and regardless of how the reader would value any particular sample injury or how he or she imagines it would be treated, the federal government assigns it the value shown for use in benefit-cost analysis.
If one knows the number of injuries of each AIS level, it is straightforward to estimate the economic value of injuries in the Northridge earthquake by Equation 1:
where Y denotes the total estimated value of injuries, N s denotes the estimated number of injuries whose severity level is s, and V s denotes the value of avoiding one statistical injury of severity s.
For the present work, Shoaf applied professional judgment as an expert in public health and earthquake injury epidemiology to relate the injury categories depicted in Figure 1 to the AIS levels of Table 1 . The result is shown in Table 2 . Note that there is some overlap between AIS levels for a given level of treatment, but the categories do approximately correspond to AIS levels 1 to 6 from bottom to top.
It may be tempting to ignore or discount the two bottom categories of Figure 1 . Although 7% of all injuries were treated outside of emergency rooms ͑the category second from the bottom͒, this was real care for real injuries, care that must be planned for and that costs time and money. And although 90% of injuries were not treated ͑the bottom category of Figure 1͒ , FHWA figures and AIS definitions do not distinguish treated from untreated injuries. Table 2 details the result of applying Equation 1 using Figure 1 , Table 1 , and our mapping between treatment and AIS level. Considering the uncertain mapping from treatment to AIS level, the value of injuries in the 1994 Northridge earthquake is estimated to be $1.3 to 2.2 billion in 1994, or $1.7 to 2.9 billion in 2005 ͑using a Consumer Price Index deflator͒. More precisely, U.S. government would assign a value today of approximately $1.7 to 2.9 billion to mitigation measures that would prevent all of those injuries. To put this figure in perspective, the 1994 Northridge earthquake caused documented costs of $24 billion, with perhaps an additional $30 billion in previously unreported costs, of which a total of approximately $50 billion was for direct capital losses and direct business interruption ͑Eguchi et al. 1998, Seligson and Eguchi 2005͒ . The $50 billion ͑1994 US$͒ does not include the economic value of injuries. Thus the economic-equivalent value of injuries in the Northridge earthquake represents 3-4% additional human loss over the $50 billion in estimated direct-capital and businessinterruption losses.
The expected annual loss due to earthquake in the United States is on the order of Nonfatal injuries in the Northridge earthquake account for most of the total cost. The bulk of this value is attributable to AIS scores 1 and 2. Only 4% of the total amount is 1 Total injuries rounded to 3 significant figures; total dollar amounts rounded to 2 significant figures associated with fatalities. Thus it appears that the vast bulk of the value to be gained through casualty risk mitigation is in reducing nonfatal injuries. What is being done to address this source of risk?
INJURIES IN BUILDING CODES AND PERFORMANCE-BASED PROCEDURES
When considering earthquake injuries, performance analyses both for older and newer buildings focus on evaluating or controlling life-threatening injuries, but tend to ignore nonfatal ones. For example, FEMA-227 ͑VSP Associates 1992͒ deals with the economic value of deaths avoided in its treatment of the costs and benefits of seismic rehabilitation of hazardous buildings, but does not consider nonfatal injuries. Vision 2000 ͑SEAOC 1996͒ does not mention injury prevention as a performance objective. FEMA-356 ͑ASCE 2000͒, which defines whole-building performance levels in its performance-based earthquake engineering methodology, explicitly mentions ͑and accepts͒ the potential for injuries under its life-safety structural and nonstructural performance levels, but makes no mention of nonfatal injuries under the immediate occupancy, damage-control, or operational performance levels ͑at which levels the vast majority of injuries probably occur͒. The authors are aware of no laboratory research in the United States to improve our understanding of and ability to model nonfatal earthquake injuries. ͑For that matter, the same can be said of fatal injuries, beyond efforts to estimate collapse potential. Only a fraction of occupants in collapsed buildings are killed, and little is known about that process either.͒
TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTY
Discussion so far has treated uncertainty only briefly, and indeed some parameters of Equation 1 are known with certainty. The number of people in the top four treatment categories of Table 2 were determined by a thorough survey of hospitals, not by sampling. The values V s for a given AIS level are accepted by agencies of the federal government and are therefore fixed. However, there are some uncertainties in the present analysis. Because a population-based survey was used to produce the estimated number of people in the last three categories of Table 2 , the parameter N s in Equation 1 is uncertain in these three cases. Because the mapping from treatment category to AIS is uncertain in five cases, the value of V s for those five treatment levels is uncertain.
Thus eight of the values in Equation 1 are uncertain. The total value of injuries in the Northridge earthquake is therefore uncertain, but the uncertainty can be estimated. We used a quadrature method presented by Julier and Uhlmann ͑2002͒ to estimate the mean and variance of the total value of injuries. The method estimates the mean, variance, and several higher moments of a function of uncertain variables, as follows:
and where Y is the output value of interest; X is the vector of basic uncertain input variables being sampled; f͑X͒ is the function that estimates Y; X i is one sample of vector X; P X is the covariance matrix of X, ͑ ͱ ͑n + k͒P X ͒ i is the ith column of the matrix square root of ͑n + k͒P X ; n is the number of uncertain variables; and k is any real number ͑k R͒.
In the present application, Y is the value of injuries in the Northridge earthquake. Equation 1 gives the function f͑X͒. Uncertain X's are taken as ͑a͒ N s , the number of persons each of the bottom three categories of Table 2 , and ͑b͒ V s , the value associated with the middle five treatment categories ͑i.e., the mapping from treatment to AIS͒. Thus in Equation 2, n =8. The value n + k is set to 3, per Julier and Uhlmann ͑2002͒. The standard deviation of the number of injuries in the bottom three categories of Table 2 Using Equation 2, the expected value injuries is estimated to be $1.8 billion in 1994, with a standard deviation of just over $250 million, or 14% of the expected value. Thus the 90% confidence bounds ͑5th and 95th percentile͒ for the value of injuries in the 1994 Northridge earthquake are $1.3 to $2.2 billion in 1994, or $1.8 to $2.9 billion in 2005.
CONCLUSIONS
The 1994 Northridge earthquake injured approximately 246,000 people, according to recent research. Using U.S. government figures for the equivalent economic value of fatal and nonfatal injuries, one can estimate a total dollar value of these injuries to be $1.3 to 2.2 billion in 1994 ͑$1.8 to 2.9 billion in 2005͒, or approximately 3-4% of the estimated $50 billion in direct capital and business-interruption losses. Of the injury cost, 96% is associated with nonfatal injuries. Less than 1% is associated with structural damage. The majority of the injury cost is associated with nonstructural damage. This is an issue largely ignored by code writers and other officials. The implication is that earthquake-induced nonfatal injuries in the United States are worthy of substantial research and mitigation.
